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quately addressed by section 7-204(2) of the UCC.19e Accordingly,
it would appear inequitable to hold a bailee liable for the entire
value of the stored property especially since he may never have
been aware of the actual value of the goods. It is submitted, there-
fore, that a more evenhanded approach towards remedying poten-
tially fraudulent activity in bailment situations is warranted. One
possible approach would be to limit statutorily the amount of dam-
ages recoverable in either a negligence or conversion action to a
value declared at the commencement of the bailment.
Peter N. Cubita
Warrantless search of arrestee's property inaccessible to him at
time of search not valid as incident to lawful arrest
The fourth amendment to the Constitution protects an indi-
ney 1978). Two Court of Appeals decisions vividly illustrate the judicial hostility toward
attempted limitations of liability. In Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963), the Court addressed the issue of
whether a liability limiting provision accompanying film sold by Eastman Kodak was suffi-
ciently unequivocal to effectively limit the company's liability for negligence. Id. at 302, 189
N.E.2d at 693-94, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The limitation of liability provided:
This film will be replaced if defective in manufacture, labeling, or packaging,
or if damaged or lost by us or any subsidiary company. Except for such replace-
ment, the sale or subsequent handling of this film for any purpose is without war-
ranty or other liability of any kind. Since dyes used with color films, like other
dyes, may, in time, change, this film will not be replaced for, or otherwise war-
ranted against, any change in color.
Id. at 303, 189 N.E.2d at 694, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 339. Although the plaintiff concededly had
notice of the provision, the Willard Van Dyke Court held that the agreement to limit liabil-
ity for negligence was not expressed in sufficiently "clear and unequivocal terms." Id. at 305,
189 N.E.2d at 695, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 340. Alternatively, the Court concluded that the plaintiff
reasonably could have believed that the provision was inapplicable to the processing of the
film because the notice also stated that the cost of processing was not included in the price
of the film. Id. Similarly, in Gross v. Sweet, the Court held that an agreement to "waive any
and all claims" against several defendants did not effectively limit liability for negligence
because the intention of the parties was not expressed in "unmistakable language." 49
N.Y.2d 102, 107-09, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-69; cf. Klar v. H. & M.
Parcel Rooln, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 541, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296
N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947) (bailor must have reasonable notice of and assent to terms
of exculpatory clause).
1 Section 7-204 of the UCC requires that warehousemen who attempt to limit liability
for negligence must, on the written request of the bailor, afford the bailor the opportunity to
increase the level of liability in exchange for the payment of a higher storage fee. N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 7-204(2) (McKinney 1964).
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vidual from unreasonable searches and seizures. l e Although gener-
ally, warrantless searches have been found to be presumptively un-
reasonable per se,19 certain limited exceptions exist whereby a
search conducted in the absence of a warrant may be sustained as
reasonable.199 One such exception permits the search of an arres-
tee's person and the area "within his immediate control" as "inci-
dent to a lawful arrest. 2 00 Notably, however, courts applying the
191 The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
The central focus of the amendment is to place a disinterested magistrate between a
possibly "overzealous" officer and the individual searched in order to guard against unrea-
sonable invasions of privacy interests. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948);
see United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering
the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1117, 1148 (1978). The fourth amend-
ment, however, does not confer upon the individual a general right of privacy. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967); see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 n.6
(1977).
1"I Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553,
557, 378 N.E.2d 99, 101, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1978) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)); see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Generally, evi-
dence obtained from an unlawful search is inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
see W. RIcHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 560, at 561-62 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
I" United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 & n.19 (1967); see, e.g.,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (search performed in "hot pursuit"); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967) (search of impounded property subject to forfeiture); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948) (search where exigent circumstances exist); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) (search of mobile automobile if probable cause for search was present). See
generally Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable
Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 198, 199-200 (1977).
The burden is on the state to show that the warrantless search was justified by exigent
circumstances and, therefore, was reasonable. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Peo-
ple v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 686, 339 N.E.2d 170, 177, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480, 490 (1975)
(Wachtler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
200 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The search incident to a lawful arrest
is an early exception to the warrant requirement. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), the Supreme Court, in dictum, observed that English and American Law has always
recognized that it is lawful to conduct a search of the accused's person when lawfully ar-
rested. Id. at 392. The justification for a warrantless search incident to an arrest is to seize
weapons that could be used to effect an escape or assault an officer, and to thwart the de-
struction of ephemeral evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Haddad, supra note 199, at 203; see Arkansas v.
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incident to arrest exception have differed in their interpretation of
what constitutes the arrestee's area of immediate control. 0 1 Re-
cently, in People v. Belton, e20 the Court of Appeals held that the
warrantless search of a jacket not immediately accessible to an ar-
restee at the time of the search was unreasonable and, conse-
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 (1977). New
York has recognized the search incident to arrest exception. E.g., People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d
368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467 (1961).
It has been held that to be valid, a search incident to a lawful arrest must be substan-
tially contemporaneous with that arrest. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15
(1977); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 367 (1964); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925). In Preston, the Supreme Court observed that the justifications for
allowing a search incident to arrest are "absent where a search is remote in time or place
from the arrest." 376 U.S. at 367. But see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
The Edwards Court upheld the warrantless search of the defendant's clothing 10 hours after
the arrest as incident to the arrest. Id. at 801-02. Disregarding that the "administrative
mechanics" of the arrest were completed and that ample time was available to procure a
warrant, the Court asserted that if the search was reasonable at the moment of arrest, then
it was also reasonable a "substantial" time later. Id. at 804, 807; see Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 239 (1960); Note, Warrantless Search Incident To Arrest: New Standards for
Delayed Searches, 46 U. COLo. L. REv. 587, 593 (1975). Subsequent to its decision in Ed-
wards, however, the Court reaffirmed the requirement set forth in Stoner and Preston that
the search be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); see United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 17 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
17, 1980).
The New York Court of Appeals also has observed the need for the search to be simul-
taneous with the arrest. E.g., People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 371 N.E.2d 528, 531, 400
N.Y.S.2d 810, 813 (1977); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 508, 300 N.E.2d 139, 143,
346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1973); People v. Lewis, 26 N.Y.2d 547, 551, 260 N.E.2d 538, 540, 311
N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (1970). The Evans Court went so far as to remark that "the search and
arrest must constitute a single res gestae." 43 N.Y.2d at 166, 371 N.E.2d at 531, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 813.
201 The permissible area of search has been alternately extended and curtailed. Com-
pare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-68 (1969) with Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). In
Rabinowitz, the search of an entire room where the arrest occurred was upheld, since the
Supreme Court declared that the proper test was whether the search was reasonable, and
not whether it was reasonable to obtain a search warrant. 339 U.S. at 66. Chimel, however,
overruled Rabinowitz, declaring that no justification existed for the search to go beyond
that area where the arrestee could "obtain weapons or evidentiary items." 395 U.S. at 766.
Although Chimel was addressed to the warrantless search of an entire house, it has been
applied to searches of personal luggage in automobiles. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
764-65 n.13 (1979); see 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1, at 499 (1978); Note, Crimi-
nal Law: The Effect of Chimel v. California on Automobile Search and Seizure, 23 OKLA. L.
REv. 447, 450-52 (1970); Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle
Searches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626, 636-40 (1970).
202 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980), rev'g, 68 App. Div. 2d 198,
416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (4th Dep't 1979).
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quently, the evidence obtained therefrom must be suppressed. 03
In Belton, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped by a
state trooper for a traffic violation.2 ' While questioning the driver,
the officer detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the car
and noticed an envelope on the floor of the type frequently used in
packaging the drug for sale.205 After ordering all four occupants
from the car, frisking them, 06 and inspecting the envelope, the
trooper ascertained that the envelope contained marijuana.0 7 The
officer arrested the occupants, who were still outside the car, and
then searched the pockets of the jackets on the back seat.2 8 In one
of them, he found a quantity of cocaine and the defendant's identi-
fication.20 9 At his subsequent trial for possession of a controlled
substance, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained
during the search.2 10 The Ontario County Court denied the mo-
tion,21' and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, af-
firmed.212
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
warrantless search of the jacket was not an incident to the arrest
and, hence, could not be upheld as reasonable. 21 ' Chief Judge
Cooke, writing for the majority,214 initially acknowledged that
upon arrest, the danger exists that the subject may attempt to de-
stroy evidence of a crime or obtain a weapon. 2" Hence, the Court
continued, it is both reasonable and necessary that a speedy war-
rantless search "of the arrestee's person and the area within his
immediate control" be conducted.216 Nevertheless, stated the ma-
20 50 N.Y.2d at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
104 Id.
105 Id.
006 Unlike a search, a frisk can be performed without arresting the suspect. See, e.g.,
People v. Bowles, 29 App. Div. 2d 996, 996, 289 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (3d Dep't 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969).
1- 50 N.Y.2d at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
20s Id.
" Id.
00 See id. See generally CPL §§ 710.20, A0, .70 (1971 & Supp. 1979-1980); W. RicH-
ARDSoN, supra note 198, § 561(a).
s1 See 68 App. Div. 2d at 199, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24.
2-2 Id. at 201, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
213 50 N.Y.2d at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
104 Chief Judge Cooke was joined by Judges Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg, and Meyer.
Judge Gabrielli filed a dissenting opinion in which Judge Jasen joined.
215 50 N.Y.2d at 450, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see note 200 supra.
10 50 N.Y.2d at 450, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (citing Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
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jority, the arrestee's privacy interest in possessions not within his
immediate grasp is not forfeited once he is "effectively neutral-
ized" or the "object is within the exclusive control of the police.1217
Therefore, any search extended into these areas is unlawful.2 18 The
"critical inquiry," the Court announced, is whether the defendant
had access to the property at the time of search." 9 Noting that in
the case before it, the defendant's jacket was "within the exclusive
custody and control of the police," the occupants of the car were
"safely away from the vehicle," and their transportation to the po-
lice station was "imminent," the Court concluded that the exigen-
cies necessary to justify the warrantless search were absent.220
Thus, it was held that evidence obtained from the illegal search
should be suppressed. 21
Dissenting, Judge Gabrielli objected to the majority's disre-
gard for the findings of fact made by the lower courts.22 It had
been determined below and amply supported in the record, the
dissent noted, that, at the time of the search, the jackets were ac-
cessible to the defendants and not yet within the exclusive control
of the police.2 23 Hence, according to Judge Gabrielli, the conclusion
was inescapable that, having been incident to a lawful arrest, the
search was reasonable.224
The holding in Belton, that items not immediately accessible
to an arrestee may not legally be subjected to a warrantless search,
constitutes a marked departure from the position previously ad-
hered to by the Court of Appeals. Belton expressly overruled ear-
lier cases of the Court which had upheld warrantless searches of
2"2 50 N.Y.2d at 451, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576; see Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
218 50 N.Y.2d at 451, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The Court observed that
although the arrest may establish the authority for the search, "it does not transform the
initial predicate into carte blanche justification to rummage through all articles" associated
with the arrestee. Id.
21 Id.
220 Id. at 452, 407 N.E.2d at 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
223 Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the present case is "illustra-
tive of the type of situation in which a warrantless search is most appropriate." Id.
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Emphasizing that the search was conducted by a lone policeman
in the presence of four unknown individuals, Judge Gabrielli concluded that the majority
erred in assuming from the facts that both the arrestees and their property had "been con-
clusively and safely reduced to the complete control of the officer, as a matter of law." Id. at
455, 407 N.E.2d at 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 55:167
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property clearly within the exclusive control of the police, purport-
edly on the basis of the incident to arrest exception. 25 These deci-
sions, it appears, by sanctioning an arbitrary standard of exigency
predicated solely on contemporaneousness with the arrest, had
subverted the express purpose of the fourth amendment.22 6 Also
overruled, albeit implicitly, were prior decisions wherein the novel
"maximum intrusion" test had been applied to validate warrant-
less searches of "particularized" property undertaken at or near
2"' In the course of its decision, the Belton Court overruled People v. De Santis, 46
N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979), and
People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 313 N.E.2d 49, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1974). In De Santis, the
Court had upheld the warrantless search of a suitcase in a police substation, notwithstand-
ing that the suitcase was under exclusive police control at the time of search and that it was
known to be free from weapons or explosives. 46 N.Y.2d at 86, 385 N.E.2d at 578-79, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 840. The search was validated due to its "close nexus" to the time and place of
the arrest, and not because the arrestee could gain access to the suitcase. Id. at 89, 385
N.E.2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 842. Similarly, in Darden, the Court found no difficulty in
sustaining the warrantless search of an attache case already in police custody since at the
time of arrest, the defendant was in possession of the case. 34 N.Y.2d at 180, 313 N.E.2d at
51, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
Notably, prior to Belton, it was unsettled in New York whether a search incident to an
arrest had to be restricted to those items the defendant could have reached when stopped
by the police, see People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d at 180, 313 N.E.2d at 51, 356 N.Y.S.2d at
585; People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 508, 300 N.E.2d 139, 143, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 563, 260 N.E.2d 815, 817,
312 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1970) (dictum), or to those items that the defendant could have
reached at the time the search was commenced, see People v. Fields, 45 N.Y.2d 986, 988-90,
385 N.E.2d 1040, 1040-41, 413 N.Y.S.2d 112, 112-13 (1978); People v. Williams, 37 N.Y.2d
206, 208, 333 N.E.2d 160, 160, 371 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1975). In holding that "the critical
inquiry focuses upon the extent to which the arrestee may gain access to the property," and
that no warrantless search is permissible after an item is in the exclusive control of the
police or after the defendant is neutralized, the Belton Court restricted lawful warrantless
searches incident to arrest to those items the defendant could reach at the time the search is
commenced. 50 N.Y.2d at 451, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576. At the very least,
therefore, Belton overrules Darden and Fitzpatrick on this issue. See Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
126 It is settled that the reasonableness of warrantless searches is a function of exigency.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). The fact of contemporaneousness of
search and arrest, as the Supreme Court has recently indicated, see United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), is not a determinant of exigency, but rather it is an element
thereof. See note 200 supra. Indeed, as the Court noted in Chadwick, "warrantless searches
of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as an incident
to that arrest if either the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest,' or no exigency
exists." 433 U.S. at 15; see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979). In People v. De
Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912
(1979), and People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 313 N.E.2d 49, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1974), how-
ever, the Court focused solely on the search's "close nexus" in time and place to the arrest,
see note 225 supra, thereby rendering the proximate concurrence of search and arrest dis-
positive, and eroding the protection of the fourth amendment.
1980]
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the time of arrest.22 7 Categorizing the search of property inaccessi-
ble to an arrestee as a less objectionable intrusion than either the
arrest itself2 28 or than the posting of a guard while a search war-
rant was sought,229 the Court previously had sustained such
searches. In the wake of Belton's conclusion that an arrestee does
not forfeit his privacy interest in nonaccessible items upon arrest,
it certainly appears that such result no longer would obtain.
By recognizing as dispositive the extent to which an arrestee
may obtain access to the property searched, the decision in Belton
appears to comport with prevailing Supreme Court authority.230
22 In People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462, 315 N.E.2d 452, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1974), the
Court upheld the search of the defendant's property, contained in a police envelope, while
the defendant was under police control. Id. at 465, 315 N.E.2d at 454-55, 358 N.Y.S.2d at
386-87. The search was justified not on the ground that it was incident to the arrest, but
because of the "maximum intrusion already effected by an arrest and detention pending
arraignment." Id. at 467, 315 N.E.2d at 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 389. Similarly, in People v.
Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 339 N.E.2d 170, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
911 (1976), the Court upheld the search of closed bureau drawers where both defendants
were arrested and handcuffed in different rooms because obtaining a search warrant would
have required placing a guard at the premises until the warrant was obtained. Id. at 680-81,
339 N.E.2d at 174, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86; see People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 87, 385
N.E.2d 577, 579, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979) ("practical
impetus" for warrantless searches is that arrests are major intrusions on privacy interests of
arrestees).
228 People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462, 315 N.E.2d 452, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1974). While
acknowledging that an arrestee "under effective police control is hardly in a position to use
a weapon or destroy evidence," id. at 467, 315 N.E.2d at 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 388, the Perel
Court nevertheless held that this is "too simple an explanation," and that the search is
reasonable solely because it is a lesser intrusion than the greater personal intrusion of the
arrest. The Court stated:
Given the nature of the gross instrusion (sic) by detention of the person it is
reasonable to conduct a less intrusive search of his person and the possessions he
carried with him. If logic, to the minds of some, may not seem to compel the rule,
history supports it and precedents justify it.
Id. at 467, 315 N.E.2d at 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 389. The Court, however, presents no author-
ity which supports this contention. Although the genesis of the maximum intrusion princi-
ple is unclear, the Court in People v. Clements found support for it in Justice White's dis-
senting opinion in Chimel v. California. People v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 681 n.3, 339
N.E.2d 170, 174 n.3, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480, 486 n.3 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976)
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 775 n.5 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)).
" People v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 680, 339 N.E.2d 170, 173, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480, 485
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); see note 228 supra. One commentator has noted
that, frequently, where the incident to arrest exception is employed, the exigency purport-
edly justifying the search has been "unnecessarily created" by the arresting officers. 2 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 201, at 412. Professor LaFave states, "while it is true that the police
may not be in a position to go for a search warrant after they have tipped their hand by
making an arrest, this does not explain why it would not often be possible to avoid those
'exigent circumstances' by simply obtaining a search warrant before the arrest is made." Id.
23o See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
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Indeed, the Supreme Court recently has reiterated that where the
property to be searched has been reduced to the exclusive control
of the police, thus eliminating the possibility that it could be reac-
quired or destroyed by the arrestee or a third party prior to the
time required to obtain a search warrant, the exigent circum-
stances which would have justified a warrantless search no longer
exist.231 Such reasoning, followed in Belton, which recognizes the
legitimacy of an incident to arrest search only where it is demon-
strated that at the time of the intrusion the safety of the arresting
officers or the continued viability of evidence were realistically im-
plicated, seems to best preserve the sanctity of the constitutional
prohibition of unreasonable searches.32
Mark Goldstein
U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
231 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979). In Sanders, the Supreme Court held
unlawful the warrantless search of a suitcase seized from the trunk of a taxi where it was
clear that the police were in control of the car and its occupants. Id. The Court, conceding
that it granted review to rectify misinterpretations of its decision in United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), held that where the police have exclusive control of the article to be
searched, the search of the property should await the issuance of a warrant. 442 U.S. at 766.
231 One method which effectuates the purpose of fourth amendment protection is the
system of telephonic search warrants. Notably, in the federal system, a federal magistrate is
empowered to issue a warrant "based upon sworn oral testimony communicated by tele-
phone or other appropriate means." FED. P, CriM. P. 41(c)(2). The rule was promulgated
"for the purpose of enabling warrants to be procured as expeditiously as possible." United
States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 400 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1978). To successfully suppress evidence
obtained from the search, under the federal rule, there must be a showing of "bad faith" on
the part of the police officer in procuring the warrant. FED. R. CaM. P. 41(c)(2)(G).
At least two state jurisdictions have telephonic search warrant statutes. Aiz. Rv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3914(c), 13-3915(c) (1978); CAL. PENeAL CODE § 1528(b) (West Supp. 1980).
See generally Marek, Telephonic Search Warrants: A New Equation for Exigent Circum-
stances, 27 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 35 (1978). It is suggested that were such procedure to be
legislatively adopted in New York, it would permit the prompt discovery and seizure of
evidence, while preserving the arrestee's legitimate expectation of privacy in his property.
